The year 2000 countdown provided a uniquely visible instance of spending on information technology by U.S. companies. With public attention riveted on potential Y2K malfunctions, managers were forced to evaluate their IT and make decisions whether to modify or replace existing systems. In the aftermath of Y2K, critics charged that the problem was overblown and that companies overspent on IT.
Introduction
Public interest in the economics of information technology has shifted from the productivity paradox (Brynjolfsson 1993 ) to a debate whether companies overspend on IT (Carr 2004) . Skeptics charge that companies spend excessively on IT under the "mistaken" belief that strategic use of IT can provide a sustainable competitive advantage. They caution that companies should avoid investing in new applications and let their competitors bear the costs of experimenting with IT. Proponents argue that companies can make innovative use of IT to connect with customers and suppliers in ways that create value by taking advantage of the unique resources of a firm. On one side of the debate is the argument that IT is easily replicable and cannot provide sustained competitive advantage because profits obtained from improved business performance would be competed away. On the other side is an argument that IT may be used to leverage other firm-specific resource advantages or opportunities (Clemons and Row 1991) . A separate argument is also made that firms may develop sophisticated IT architecture and skills that are not easily replicable so that IT capabilities themselves may become a strategic resource (Mata, Fuerst and Barney 1995) . The debate leads to a question whether IT does create value that is reflected in the market value of firms and in their future profitability. This question has been hard to address empirically because of difficulties in obtaining data about IT investment that can be linked to firm performance.
Previous research relating the market value of firms to IT has relied on privately-gathered survey information (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj and Konsynski 1999, Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang 2002) or public announcements of IT initiatives (Dos Santos, Peffers and Mauer 1993 , Im, Dow and Grover 2001 , Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud 2003 . Due to investor interest in potential business interruptions resulting from year 2000 turnover problems, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated disclosures about Y2K preparations in quarterly and annual financial reports issued by publicly-traded U.S. companies. Among the items companies were required to disclose were the amounts expended on IT to prepare for Y2K including costs of remediating existing systems and costs of replacing systems if the replacements were motivated or accelerated by Y2K concerns. These disclosures gave investors and analysts unprecedented access to information about the cost of firms' IT activities. The public disclosure of Y2K spending enables us to relate shareholder value to IT spending in the same manner that previous researchers have related shareholder value to other items reported in periodic financial reports such as research and development spending (Lev and Sougiannis 1996) .
The publicity and specter of potential disaster surrounding Y2K raised concern about Y2K solutions to top management levels of large corporations. Moreover, the Y2K frenzy occurred at a dynamic time in the development and deployment of enterprise systems and other e-business applications that could alter the way companies did business. So as managers looked towards the new millennium, they were faced not only with concerns about their preparation for the year 2000 date turnover but also their ability to compete effectively in an increasingly information technology-oriented business world.
Thus, Y2K was more than fixing a bug; it was an opportunity for managers to improve their IT systems.
The combination of advances in business applications of IT, universal IT investment decisions and unparalleled disclosure of IT costs across companies provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the association between firm value and IT spending.
Critics allege that the Y2K risk was inflated and that companies spent excessive amounts on IT during the late 1990s when sales of enterprise systems were sizzling because managers could tie IT needs to Y2K (Hopkins and Kessler 2002, Strassman 2000) . We posit that Y2K helped open the way for managers to acquire IT that could position their companies to interact in new ways with customers and suppliers. We evaluate the veracity of claims that Y2K spending eroded shareholder value by looking directly at the association between Y2K spending and the market value of Fortune 1000 firms. Contrary to the allegations that firms got carried away in their Y2K spending, we find no evidence of a negative association between shareholder value and Y2K spending during 1999 or in the subsequent four years from 2000 to 2003.
Recent research has identified differences in the strategic roles of IT across industries during specific periods of time (Armstrong and Sambarmurthy 1999, Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud 2001) .
These strategic roles have been classified into three categories labeled automate, informate and transform (Zuboff 1998 , Schein 1992 . In automate industries, the primary role of IT is to replace human labor by automating business processes. In informate industries, IT provides data/information to empower management and employees. In transform industries, IT fundamentally alters traditional ways of doing business by redefining business processes and relationships (Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud 2001) . Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) employed a panel of experts made up of researchers and practitioners to classify industries according to these different strategic roles during the period 1995 to 1998, a time period that corresponds closely to the Y2K preparation period. They investigated the stock market response to announcements of appointments of IT executives and found significantly positive abnormal returns surrounding appointments of IT executives in transform industries but not in other industries. Their evidence supports the argument that managers of firms in these industries were more likely to pursue innovative IT projects that would enhance firm value than managers of firms in other industries. 1 It also indicates that investors and analysts discriminated across industries according to the strategic role of IT.
Our main thesis is that managers may have taken advantage of the Y2K situation to make opportunistic investments in IT that gave them capabilities to create value by interacting differently with their customers and suppliers. Because there would have been greater opportunities to make innovative investments in IT for firms operating in transform industries, we evaluate the association between firm value and Y2K spending separately for firms in automate, informate and transform industries. We find significantly greater positive associations between firm value measured during the years 1999 through 2003 and Y2K spending for firms in transform industries than for firms in the informate and automate industries.
Our research contributes to the debate whether IT matters. Carr (2003) observed that a competitive advantage obtained through innovative investment in IT is likely to be short-lived because competing firms would mimic successful IT applications. He encouraged managers to avoid the high costs of IT leadership. The question whether a competitive advantage derived from IT may be sustained has been raised frequently in the IS literature (Vitale 1986 , Clemons and Row 1991 , Mata, Fuerst and Barney 1995 Our research has important implications for managers responsible for IT investment decisions.
By documenting a high association between market value and Y2K spending in the transform industries, our analysis indicates that, in situations when IT facilitates changes in business practices in an industry, managers must respond aggressively by investing in IT in order to maintain or improve their firms' competitive positions. Our findings that the high association between market value and Y2K spending for firms in transform industries was sustained through the market downturn in 2000-01 and beyond indicates that this higher market valuation was not due to market infatuation with technology but to perceived sustained benefits from improvements in business operations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe features of the Y2K setting in section 2. We develop our hypotheses in the context of relevant previous research in section 3. We present our empirical models in section 4. We describe the data and provide the results of estimating the models in section 5. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for managers and researchers in section 6.
The Year 2000 and Investment in IT
A number of features of the Y2K environment make it an interesting research setting. The twodigit date constraint that was dubbed the "Y2K bug" was carried forward in legacy systems that were costly to remediate and maintain. Managers faced decisions whether to expend the resources necessary to remediate existing systems or to apply those resources to the acquisition of new systems. Buchner (1999) observed that "Replacements and upgrades installed as part of the Year 2000 strategy provide immediate benefits such as performance gains that increase customer responsiveness and the ability to meet information needs, which in turn becomes a competitive advantage. Longer term, these infrastructure upgrades provide additional headroom to support growth in business volumes or to implement new strategic applications, such as data warehousing and Business Intelligence (BI) applications, or e-business and e-commerce applications".
The SEC interpretation (August 4, 1998) 4 We performed a logit analysis of Fortune 1000 companies based on whether they were included on SAP's best customer list (at the SAP AG website) in early 2000. 5 We found a significantly positive relation (p-value = 0.0040) between being on the SAP list and Y2K
2 For Fortune 1000 firms that provided information about their Y2K spending in reports for periods ending on or before December 31, 1998, the average of actual spending to date to total budgeted spending was 54.54% (median = 54.08%). This indicates that over half of anticipated Y2K spending occurred before December 31, 1998. 3 We reviewed the Y2K disclosures for a large number of firms in our sample and found that most indicated that their Y2K preparations included a mixture of remediation and replacement of existing systems. Except for a few cases where companies indicated directly that they had implemented ERP systems, the disclosures did not describe specific types of IT that were acquired. 4 Xenakis (2000) Gormley et al. (1998) reported that IT costs made up only about one-fifth of the total costs of implementing ERP systems. Because the non-IT costs are typically recorded as expenses for financial reporting purposes, these organizational investments may contribute to the unrecorded intangible asset value of companies (Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang 2002) . Carr (2003) proclaims that opportunities for gaining strategic advantage from IT are rapidly disappearing and cites studies that show that companies with the biggest IT investments rarely post the best financial results. He advises companies to spend less on IT and especially to avoid leading or innovative investments in IT. Other technology critics charge that companies overspent on Y2K by amounts as high as $150 billion (Scannell 2000 , Strassman 2000 and that companies continued to squander billions on IT after Y2K (Hopkins and Kessler 2002) . To support their arguments, they point to situations where individual companies spent millions on new IT and were disappointed because new systems did not deliver anticipated benefits. They accuse companies of making IT acquisitions too quickly, deploying new IT poorly, and purchasing unneeded technology. They allege that Y2K hype led to panic buying and that the technology boom of the late 1990s fostered a "me too" attitude that had companies buying new technology to "keep up" with their peer firms.
Development of Hypotheses
An investment in IT is innovative if it alters technological production possibilities or affords the creation of new products or services (Tirole 1988) . Like investments in research and development and other innovative activities, investments in IT are risky and produce a mixture of successful and unsuccessful projects. Anecdotal reference to a few instances of poor IT project performance is not sufficient to justify claims of general overspending on IT. Evaluation of the success of IT investing requires a broad look at the value implications of IT spending for a large set of firms. The Y2K case provides an opportunity to evaluate the effects of IT spending on shareholder value for a broad crosssection of firms.
A notion has prevailed in the information systems literature that productivity gains from IT are passed on to customers because innovative applications of IT are difficult to protect from imitation by competitors (Vitale 1986 ). According to this argument, if one firm in an industry realizes improved productivity from an innovative application of IT, its industry peers will obtain similar IT and drive away the abnormal profits of the first firm. This argument is based on an assumption of either perfect or
Bertrand competition and equivalence of abilities across firms within an industry to utilize IT. But, as Clemons and Row (1991) and Mata, Fuerst and Barney (1995) observed, firms in an industry are not identical and may differ along dimensions that influence their ability to profitably employ new IT.
Clemons and Row (1991) used transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975 ) as a basis for evaluating the economic effects of IT on the structures and processes linking different business activities. By reducing transaction costs, IT allows higher levels of coordination, increasing the value of the coordinated resources. Drawing on the study of strategy and the economics of innovation (Barney 1986 , Rumelt 1987 , Teece 1987 ), Clemons and Row (1991) Some resources cannot be readily acquired or sold because they are specialized and non-separable from the firm that produces and controls them (Rubin 1973 , Rumelt 1982 , Williamson 1975 ).
Our analysis is aimed at the question whether companies can create value by making innovative investments in IT. We look at the Y2K case from the point of view that managers could have taken advantage of Y2K to make opportunistic investments in IT that positioned them for e-business opportunities. The Y2K bug effectively reduced the marginal cost of replacing old IT with new IT because remediation costs could be avoided if the firm acquired new IT that was Y2K compliant.
Surveys and media reports linking Y2K to investments in ERP and other systems suggest that firms did make investments in innovative IT in preparation for Y2K (Buchner 1999 , Foremski 1999 , Manchester 1999 , Telberg 2000 , Xenakis 2000 . But the Y2K spending disclosures do not distinguish between corrective spending on existing IT and opportunistic investing in new IT. If higher Y2K spending was due to greater investing in innovative IT, then we may observe a positive relation between shareholder value and Y2K spending.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between shareholder value and Y2K spending.
In industries where IT primarily played an automating role during the Y2K period, it is unlikely that firms would have made innovative investments in IT that leveraged existing resources in a manner that could not have been easily replicated by other firms. However, in industries where IT played an informating role, new IT may have enabled improvement in the coordination of business activities by some firms. For example, investments in IT by firms with flexible human resource and structural capabilities may have allowed them to respond more quickly to information that conveyed shifts in product demand.
Hypothesis 2: There is greater positive association between shareholder value and Y2K spending for firms in the informate industries than for firms in the automate industries.
The marginal productivity of new IT may be affected by organizational changes made in tandem with implementation of new IT. In this regard, investment in new IT may complement new investment in other organizational assets. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) observed that complementarity and optimization
give substance to claims that a firm's strategy, structure and managerial processes need to fit one another (Chandler 1962) . Complementarity, in their analysis, means that doing more of one thing increases the returns to doing more of another. Brynjolfsson and Yang (1999) found that $5 to $20 of firm value were associated with each dollar of IT capital whereas only about $1 of firm value was associated with each dollar of property, plant and equipment recorded in the company's financial statements. They surmised that the high multiples on IT capital were due to costly but unrecorded investments in organizational assets. In a follow-up study, Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) found that the market value multiples on IT capital increased with specific organizational characteristics such as greater use of teams, broader decision-making authority and worker training.
When IT plays a transforming role, it facilitates changes to business processes and interrelations with internal and external parties that may improve the results of business operations. To the extent that investments in organizational changes are unrecorded, they may add to shareholder value without adding to the accounting book value of a company. If new IT and organizational changes are complementary (meaning that returns to investing in one increase the returns to investing in the other), additional intangible asset value is created.
Hypothesis 3: There is greater positive association between shareholder value and Y2K spending for firms in the transform industries than for firms in the informate and automate industries.
A potential competitive advantage from IT may be diminished if peer firms make similar investments in IT (Vitale 1986 , Clemons and Row 1995 , Mata, Fuerst and Barney 1995 . This argument suggests that, in a cross-sectional analysis, firm value would increase with the firm's own investment in IT and decrease with the level of investment in IT by the firm's industry peers. But, if oligopolistic competition characterizes an industry, peer investment may not fully eliminate the value of IT investment for each firm (Tirole 1988 ). In addition, industry peer investment may have a positive influence on firm value if there are positive externalities created by investment in similar IT by a cluster of firms (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991) . Griliches (1979) described the spillover effects that occur with respect to research and development activities. He observed that the level of productivity achieved by a firm depends not only on its own research efforts but also on the level of the pool of knowledge created by the investment of other firms in its industry. Similar spillover effects may apply to innovative applications of information technology. We test whether, as argued in the prior IT literature, negative competitive effects of peer investment in IT dominate positive spillover effects, by adding the industry levels of investment in IT by industry types as separate variables to our model.
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative association between shareholder value and the industry level of spending on Y2K.
Research in financial accounting has evaluated the association between firm value and disclosures made in quarterly and annual reports including items such as R&D costs (Lev and Sougiannis 1996) and operating cash flows (Sloan 1996) . In a discussion of this literature, Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) observed that the economic intuition underlying these studies is that the disclosed items are informative about future earnings and that they are value-relevant because stock market values reflect informed expectations of future earnings. They proposed that this research would be more credible if the circuit were completed by linking the disclosed activities directly to actual future earnings. 
Empirical Models
Investments in R&D are innovative and may complement investments in other firm assets, such as marketing and distribution networks, leading to higher marginal productivity and market valuation of IT spending (Griliches 1981 , Hall 1993a , Lev and Sougiannis 1996 . In their study of differences across firms in the market value multiple of computer assets, Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) used a "Tobin's q" framework similar to that applied to the valuation of R&D by Griliches (1981) , Griliches and Cockburn (1988 ), and Hall (1993a , 1993b .
To evaluate differences across firms in the association between stock price-based values and Y2K
spending we adopted a market valuation framework similar to that applied by Lev and Sougiannis (1996) .
We were precluded from using short window event study methodology because information about Y2K preparations was not discretely disclosed at identifiable dates. 6 Our empirical model relates the market value of the firm (based on prevailing stock prices) to a combination of the current book value and earnings of the firm and other value-relevant variables (Ohlson 1995 7 We note that the unamortized cost of existing IT assets is included in the book value of the firm and the value-in-use of existing IT assets is reflected in current earnings. We included R&D spending t as a control variable because it has been shown to be value-relevant in previous research (Lev and Sougiannis 1996) and it provides a benchmark for evaluating the impact of Y2K spending. We also included, as additional control variables, sales growth t (sales in year t minus sales in year t-1) and asset growth t (total assets in year t minus total assets is year t-1) to control for the possibility that Y2K spending proxied for different dimensions of firm growth. Our empirical model (1) is specified as follows: To test hypothesis 4, we add the median value of Y2K spending by industry to model (2). We interact the industry median variable with the industry type (A, I or T) because both the positive and negative effect of this variable will depend upon the nature of the IT investments. For example, IT investments that are efficiency oriented may be more easily competed away while it may be difficult to imitate an IT investment that is related to innovation and may transform the business model.
Studies of the time-series properties of earnings (Mozes 1992, Watts and Leftwich 1977) have found that earnings in year t are informative about earnings in year t+ i and that past and future earnings growth is correlated so that year t-1 earnings may also be useful in predicting year t+i earnings. Research has also demonstrated that non-earnings information, in addition to information provided by current and past earnings, is useful in forecasting future earnings (Abarbanell and Bushee 1997, Sloan 1996) . To test hypothesis 5 that there is a positive association between Y2K spending and earnings in future periods, we add Y2K spending t to an earnings prediction model that relates earnings in period t+i to earnings in periods t and t-1.
Data and Results of Estimation
We hand-collected the Y2K spending data from Y2K disclosures in the Management Discussion The disclosures do not separate Y2K spending expensed from Y2K spending capitalized. Failure to adjust earnings for the expensed portion may cause a small upward bias on the coefficient on Y2K spending. 9 Over 90% of Fortune 1000 companies release their annual reports during the first quarter. Data were also collected from filings made in the remaining three quarters of 1999 and the first quarter of 2000. 10 We reviewed the names of non-filers for the purpose of considering whether they were more likely to be low or high Y2K spenders but found no reason to suspect that they would be biased in either direction. A number of prominent IT firms, including Microsoft, Oracle, IBM, and Hewlett Packard, were among the non-filers. 11 We deviated from the Chatterjee et al. (2001) classification for one industry group. We classified pharmaceutical manufacturers as a T industry whereas they had classified it as an I industry. Liebmann (1999) observed that nearly all drug and medical-supply companies had turned to enterprise resource planning packages, e-commerce systems, and consolidation of network and systems infrastructure to transform their business processes.
Pharmaceuticals, and Finance are the three vertical markets with the largest budgets for enterprise applications, and are increasingly spending more on enterprise applications."
We obtained accounting variables from Standard and Poors' Compustat database. These variables include income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18), the book value of common equity (#60), the number of common shares outstanding (#25), R&D expenditures (#46), net sales revenue (#12), and total assets (#6). The number of firms in the final sample is reduced because firms were not included in the Compustat data base or specific data items were missing.
We present results of our ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of model (1) spending by the firms in our sample. With respect to the control variables, the estimated coefficients on the book value, earnings and R&D spending of firms are similar to those reported in previous research (Amir 1993, Lev and Sougiannis 1996) . 12 We identified influential observations using recommended cutoffs for leverage points, Studentized residuals, the DFFITS measure, and standard influences of observations on the covariance of estimates (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 1980, Krasker, Kuh and Welsch 1983) . Observations were excluded from the analysis if any one of the four cutoffs were exceeded. We also controlled for outliers by trimming 5% of the observations (Chen and Dixon 1972) , based on Y2K spending normalized by book value in the previous period. Results of estimation for the trimmed sample were qualitatively similar to those presented. 13 We In the estimation of model (1), the coefficient on Y2K spending is constrained to a single value across all types of industries. This restrictive constraint is relaxed in the estimations of model (2) where different coefficients on Y2K spending are estimated for firms in type A, type I, and type T industries.
We present the results of estimating model (2) and realized greater increases in firm value than other firms (Clemons and Row 1991) . Firms that made contemporaneous investments in organizational assets to complement investments in IT would have increased the returns to both investments (Milgrom and Roberts 1995) . Anticipated future investment could also have affected the shareholder value of current investment in IT. For example, by investing in enterprise systems and making complementary investments that changed internal processes and external 14 The fact that the type A and type I coefficients on Y2K spending are not significantly different from zero in most cases may mean that investment in new IT did not have a significant impact on firm value or that Y2K spending in these industries was primarily corrective in nature.
interactions, firms opened the way to make complementary investments in such applications as supply chain management (SCM) or customer relationship management (CRM) systems.
We tested the relative investment hypothesis (hypothesis 4) by adding industry median Y2K spending (interacted with the three industry types) as a measure of peer spending for each of the eighteen industries described in In table 5, we present the three-stage least squares estimation (Zellner and Theil 1962) Following Hitt, Wu and Zhou (2002) who evaluated the impact of ERP systems on company performance for companies that implemented SAP during this time period, we included a number of alternative earnings-based performance measures. Type T firms that spent more on Y2K apparently realized greater improvements in profit margin on sales (Net income / Sales) and asset turnover (Sales / Total Assets) than other firms. The increase in profitability is primarily seen in the reduced ratio of cost of goods sold to sales. This indicates that firms in the transform industries that spent more on Y2K were able to increase their gross profit margins on sales, possibly because they were able to add more value for customers by connecting more closely with their needs. The increase in asset turnover is primarily seen in the higher inventory turnover (COGS / average inventory). This indicates that firms in the transform industries that spent more on Y2K were better able to coordinate their inventory needs with suppliers.
Conclusion
Managers face difficult decisions about IT investments because implementation of new IT is costly, disrupts business activities, puts strain on employees and has uncertain payoffs. In addition, there are strong incentives to put off investing in IT because a better solution may come out and it is easier to wait while others bear the costs and risks of innovating (Carr 2003) . It is also difficult to quantify the expected benefits of new IT implementations that alter the way companies do business. Y2K was an intersection of opportunities to invest in innovative IT and the requirement to deal with potentially nasty problems in existing IT.
Some critics believe that managers got carried away by the Y2K bug and made unnecessary and unwise investments (Kong and Seipel 2000) . John Gantz, chief research officer at International Data Corporation, remarked, "There has been a lot of spin doctoring to try and find benefits but the fact is that we fixed more than we needed to" (Bowen 2000) . On the other hand, Lawrence Kudlow, chief economist at Schroder & Co. Inc. in New York, argued that "the Y2K-spurred information upgrade by businesses will yield productivity, profit and rate-of-return increases that may not be officially recognized and reported for years. In particular, business-to-business and business-to-supplier information improvements are going to be a huge plus for cost control, price-cutting and inventory management" (Kudlow 2000) . Porter (1999) observed that the essential core of strategy is cross-functional or cross-activity integration, the capacity to link and integrate activities across the whole value chain. When we expanded the specification of the Y2K spending variable to evaluate the value implications across industry types, we found strong positive value implications of Y2K spending in those industries where IT was playing a transforming role. This result counters claims based on isolated anecdotal evidence that ERP and other integrated systems are not paying for themselves and suggests the need for more research on the performance effects of enterprise systems.
Our finding of overall positive value implications of investments in IT by firms in the transform industries, in the face of observed failures in some situations, illustrates the importance of differences in firms' abilities to utilize new IT (Bharadwaj 2000) . Our failure to find support for the relative investment hypothesis indicates that the competitive dynamics of IT investing are complex. While the ease of replication of IT makes it tempting to think that abnormal returns to investment in IT are likely to be wiped out by competitors making similar investments, this is not necessarily the case. Our analysis shows that companies that spent more during the Y2K period increased in value and improved their earnings performance. Y2K spending intensity is total Y2K spending divided by net sales revenue. Total Y2K spending is obtained from disclosures made in the first quarter of 1999 and net sales revenue is obtained from the 1998 financial statements. b Industry type is based on the strategic role of IT during 1995 to 1998 as determined by a panel of experts surveyed by Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) : A = automate, I = informate and T = transform. Adj. R 2 = 0.914 a p-values are for one-tailed tests when the coefficients have the predicted signs and for two-tailed tests otherwise.
